The origin and purpose of dhimmah according to the early uṣūliyyūn

Abstract

In Islām where God is established at the centre of grand ontological system of the worldview, the meaning and purpose of responsibility (taklīf) is clear from where it is derived. The responsibility is solely derived from God, and it is addressed exclusively to a natural person, the man. However, the meaning and purpose of responsibility has been going a debate in the contemporary discourse where the contemporary jurists have discussed the responsibility is extended its meaning to a non-human being or non-man, such as corporation, under the notion of the doctrine of dhimmah (substratum of responsibility). This study intends to clarify their claim by investigating the origin and development of the dhimmah which are in the discussion of the early legal theorists (uṣūliyyūn). A semantic analysis of the term dhimmah and its related key terms indicate that dhimmah is truly a God‟s exclusive endowment for a man, and not for other entities other than man. In addition, dhimmah refers to the original covenant that man‟s soul has sealed with God during the Primordial Covenant (mithāq). The findings further indicate a new hierarchy of responsibility of a man vis-à-vis the corporation can be established, where the former is derived from religion, while the later is from the state. This study will provide a philosophical and metaphysical framework in legal theory in Islām which is currently lacking, and can be of benefit for the students of legal theory as well as philosophy of ethics.