Goh, Chin Fei and Md. Rasli, Amran and Khan, Saif Ur Rehman (2014) CEO duality, board independence, corporate governance and firm performance in family firms: evidence from the manufacturing industry in Malaysia. Asian Business and Management, 13 (4). pp. 333-357. ISSN 1472-4782
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/abm.2014.4
Abstract
In this study, we use the contestability exercised by non-dominant large shareholders to measure how internal governance mechanisms influence firm monitoring in a structure with multiple large shareholders. This extends knowledge of principal-principal conflicts and family business by introducing the moderating effects of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality and board independence. Using a sample of Malaysian manufacturing family firms, we find that non-dominant large shareholders rely on board independence to strengthen firm monitoring. However, family owners do not utilise CEO duality to weaken the monitoring of non-dominant large shareholders, even though they prioritise firm control to safeguard family interests.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | board independence, ceo duality, control contestability, family firms principal-principal conflicts |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management |
Divisions: | Management |
ID Code: | 52073 |
Deposited By: | Siti Nor Hashidah Zakaria |
Deposited On: | 01 Feb 2016 03:52 |
Last Modified: | 30 Nov 2018 07:00 |
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