

# METAMORPHIC MALWARE DETECTION USING MACHINE LEARNING

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## **DEDICATION**

This project report is dedicated to:

The Almighty Allah, for bestowing me the guidance and blessings. To my beloved mother Jamilah and my father Hasan for their unconditional

love and unlimited support,

My brother and sisters, Ali, Bayan, Afnan, Halemah, Alla, and Radeeah.

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## ABSTRACT

Commercially available antivirus software relies on a traditional malware detection technique known as signature-based malware detection which fails to counter unknown signatures of malicious software. Obfuscated malware such as polymorphic or metamorphic are capable of generating a unique signature at each time of executing the malware code to avoid being detected by antivirus software. However, some imperative portions of the malicious code remain unaltered after the obfuscation process. This research project proposes an alternative method of malware detection by utilizing machine learning techniques in which informative textual string attributes were employed as features in with the aim to increase the classifier accuracy and to decrease the computational overhead. In order to develop machine learning classifier models, two phases of learning were applied which are training and testing phases. In this project, benign and malware executable files were collected, then converted to assembly code using disassembler such as IDA Pro disassembler, and then preprocessed to determine the most significant features to aid the machine learning training stage. In addition, part of the collected dataset was obfuscated to be used as testing files in order to test the accuracy of the classifier. The obtained results generated by WEKA platform show that the generative classifier model based on the SMO algorithm has the highest accuracy level and the lowest time taken to build the model. Exploiting the most important textual strings as machine learning training features reduced the computational complexity in terms of the time taken to generate the model and the computing resources such as processing power and memory space. Malware classification using machine learning algorithms proofed to be more effective than traditional signature-based antivirus scanners.

## ABSTRAK

Perisian antivirus yang tersedia secara komersial bergantung pada teknik pengesanan malware tradisional dikenali sebagai pengesanan malware berdasarkan tandatangan yang gagal mengatasi tanda tangan yang tidak diketahui perisian berbahaya. Malware yang disamarkan seperti polimorfik atau metamorfik mampu menghasilkan tandatangan unik pada setiap masa melaksanakan kod perisian hasad untuk mengelakkan daripada dikesan oleh perisian antivirus. Walau bagaimanapun, beberapa bahagian penting dari kod jahat tetap tidak berubah selepas proses pengaburan. Projek penyelidikan ini mencadangkan kaedah alternatif malware pengesanan dengan menggunakan teknik pembelajaran mesin di mana atribut rentetan teks bermaklumat digunakan sebagai ciri dengan tujuan untuk meningkatkan ketepatan pengelasan dan mengurangkan overhead pengiraan. Untuk mengembangkan model pengelasan pembelajaran mesin, dua fasa pembelajaran diterapkan iaitu fasa latihan dan ujian. Dalam projek ini, fail tidak berbahaya dan fail perisian hasad yang dapat dikumpulkan, kemudian ditukarkan ke kod pemasangan dengan menggunakan pembongkar seperti IDA Pro disassembler, dan kemudian memproses untuk menentukan ciri yang paling penting untuk membantu tahap latihan pembelajaran mesin. Selain itu, sebahagian dari kumpulan data yang dikumpulkan dikaburkan untuk digunakan sebagai menguji fail untuk menguji ketepatan pengelasan. Hasil yang diperoleh dihasilkan oleh Platform WEKA menunjukkan bahawa model pengelasan generatif berdasarkan algoritma SMO mempunyai tahap ketepatan tertinggi dan masa terendah yang diambil untuk membina model. Mengeksploitasi rentetan teks sebagai ciri latihan pembelajaran mesin mengurangkan kerumitan komputasi dari segi masa yang diambil untuk menghasilkan model dan sumber pengkomputeran seperti daya pemrosesan dan ruang memori. Klasifikasi perisian hasad yang menggunakan algoritma pembelajaran mesin terbukti lebih berkesan daripada pengimbas antivirus berasaskan tandatangan tradisional.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

GUI	-	Graphical User Interface
IDA	-	Interactive Disassembler
TPR	-	True Positive Rate
TNR	-	True Negative Rate
FNR	-	False Negative Rate
FPR	-	False Positive Rate
SMO	-	Sequential minimal optimization
NGVCK	-	Next Generation Virus Creation Kit
WEKA	-	Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Introduction

The usage of the internet has turned out to be an integral component of our life as the number of people using various services that are provided on the internet is increasing. The internet as we know it today has progressed from a simple communication structure to a group of interrelated data sources which permit, alternative ways of social communications and various retailers to promote and sell their products and services. Services and products advertising or electronic commerce are illustrations of the internet commercial features. In the virtual domain, there are individuals with malicious intentions, who attempt to gain wealth by attacking sincere users and taking advantage of them on every occasion where money is concerned. Network and computer security are major interests for the processes of organizations such as corporations, banks, governments, as well as individuals, in which immense quantity of crucial data are constantly extracted. Safeguarding these important data contained in storage devices of computers or while data transactions between different parties has become an essential duty [1].

Therefore, efficient and precise detection mechanisms have become a necessity to identify malware attacks targeting both computer and network systems. Formerly, worm named Slammer targeted several computers across the globe in a brief instance of time in which it caused massive economic damage [2].

Attacks initiated by malware have become more damaging to the data of both individuals and institutions which resulted in significant losses. For instance, in 2009 a malware known as Zeus attacked more than 3.5 million computer systems of banks in the United States of America. The estimated financial losses of the 2009 incident was approximately about 3 billion US dollars. New malwares are generated in high

rate which causing a challenge for traditional malware detection methods. A statistical analysis conducted by McAfee showed that more than 80 million malwares were captured in 2013, and in 2014 the number has increased to 140 million malwares [3]. In 2017, a statistical study performed by GDATA program revealed that in every 4 seconds, new malware variants are generated. In 2018, AV-Test which is a well-known institution that examine the performance of anti-malware software by various vendors, revealed that about 20 million samples of new malware were captured in the first three months of the year of 2018 [4]. Figure 1.1 depicts the AV-Test statistical analysis of the number of malware samples for the past ten years. Actually, the chief problem of detecting malwares is not only the huge number of malwares collected but also the sophisticated structure of the malware where the malware creators use obfuscation techniques to cover the main functionality of the malware for the purpose of evading to be detected by anti-virus software [5].




Figure 1.1: Malware statistics for the past ten years which carried out by AV-Test

Hackers make advantage of weaknesses in operating system architectures, web browsers, and online services, or exploit social engineering methods to motivate individuals to execute malicious software for the purpose of spreading them. Hackers utilize obfuscation methods such as reassigning registers, insertion of inexecutable code, reordering of the subroutine, transposition of code, integration of code, and substitution of instructions to avoid to be detected by conventional lines of defense such as gateways, firewalls, anti-virus software which relies on signature-based methods [6]. This method demands the anti-virus vendors to supply a record of signatures of already analyzed malware samples to be then compared to possible attacks. Thus, commercially available anti-virus programs are incapable to detect formerly unobserved malevolent executables.

Since obfuscated malware executables alter continuously their signatures, and hence traditional techniques are not capable to detect their presence. Machine learning techniques rely on learning from previous experiences in order to predict and classify future events. These methods might not substitute the conventional techniques of detections, but they can aid them [10]. In general, machine learning methods demand more computational resources compared to the traditional methods of detections. Additionally, one of the limitations of machine learning is the occurrence of false alarms. Also, ineffective selection of features and redundant features used to build classifier models are additional downsides of machine learning techniques [11]. Therefore, the aim of this work is to use only significant features for generating machine learning classifier models to reduce the feature space and the computational overhead to improve the classification accuracy.

## **1.2 Problem statement**

Current anti-malware software provided by various vendors utilizes signature-based detection scheme. Nonetheless, malicious code is constantly evolving and hackers are exploiting advanced obfuscation techniques such as polymorphism and metamorphism to evade detection by signature based anti-malware software [12]. Self-mutating malwares such as metamorphic malware is automatically changing its signature whenever the malware is executed. This kind of obfuscated malware makes



it difficult for traditional techniques which rely on signature matching to detect it [13]. After the obfuscation operation is initiated, a successor metamorphic malware is produced which carries inherited sections of code from its predecessor. Hackers have a practice to recycle previously known sections of code, as a result of that practice some characteristics from the predecessor metamorphic malware will remain unaltered in new self-mutated malware. It is believed that a complete metamorphic malware transmutation is not possible because complete transmutation will change the function of successor metamorphic malware which is not the goal of the hackers [14]. Therefore, different malware variants originated from a single malware will have similar composition of unaltered sections of code.

As self-mutated malware has the ability to avoid to be detected by conventional methods of detection, hence, machine learning algorithms are used which are capable to deduce patterns given by the training dataset in order to create a generative model for classification. The generative model will be able to classify unseen data sample based on its content to its respective class. In the field of malware detection, machine learning techniques have been recognized to be effective to detect unseen variants of malwares [11]. One of the limiting factors of machine learning algorithms is the false rate which depends on multitude of factors such as irrelevant features, ineffective selection of features, or incompetent classifier algorithms [11]. In addition, irrelevant features of the training dataset will increase the number of features in the feature space which will lead to increase the time needed to create a generative model for classification. Also, the increasing number of features will require more computing resource. Hence, informative textual string attributes are employed as the features in this project with the aim to increase the classifier accuracy and to decrease the computational overhead.

### **1.3 Objectives**

The purpose of this study is to accomplish the following objectives:

1. To develop machine learning classifiers which are constructed by using minimum number of textual features extracted from both malicious and benign files in order to differentiate between self-mutated and non-mutated files.

2. To identify the most suitable machine learning classifier model based on its accuracy level and false positive rate.
3. To compare the outcomes of generated machine learning classifiers with conventional anti-malware software based on signature matching technique.

#### **1.4 Scope of the research**

The concentration of this research will be on the detection of new obfuscated malicious files of the metamorphic type. The primary goal is to enhance the accuracy level of machine learning classifier models compared to the conventional malware detection. Owing to the exploratory identity of this research, the collected sets of both training and testing stages of machine learning classifier models are from offline traffic. The scopes of this study are stated as follows:

1. Training dataset comprised of benign and malware is gathered from different online samples providers. The collected dataset is utilized to develop generative classifier model.
2. Data collection, preprocessing, machine learning training and classification were conducted in virtual environment for the sake of protecting workstation from getting infected by collected malwares.
3. Textual strings were chosen as a feature for generating machine learning models. The textual strings were extracted from dataset executables using disassembler software.
4. Multiple machine learning classifier models were examined in order to determine the best classifier in terms of accuracy of detection and false rates.

#### **1.5 Thesis organization**

The report consists of a total number of five chapters which are as follows. Chapter 2 describes the literature review of related works. Chapter 3 presents the methodology followed to conduct the research project. Chapter 4 presents the experimental findings and their analysis in the which the obtained results are compared

against the traditional signature-based technique. Chapter 5 presents the concluding remarks and the recommendations for future work.

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