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The impact of government linked directors on firm performance: evidence from Oman

Elhabib, Mohamed Ateia and Abdul Rasid, Siti Zaleha and Basiruddin, Rohaida and Sayyar, Hamed (2015) The impact of government linked directors on firm performance: evidence from Oman. In: The 1st World Virtual Conference on Social and Behavioral Sciences 2015, 28-30 Jun, 2015, Johor Bahru, Malaysia.

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Official URL: http://www.akademiabaru.com/wvsocial/temp/acc5.pdf...

Abstract

The presence of government-linked board members can be an effective corporate governance mechanism and a valuable resource for companies. The presence of such board members based on resource dependence theory is expected to enhance firm performance. This paper investigates the impact of government-linked board members in Oman on firm performance using Return on Assets and Tobin’s Q as proxy for firm performance. The findings of the study revealed that having a government linked board member such as a royal family member, a cabinet minister or a deputy minister on the board of a listed company have a positive but insignificant with firm performance as measured by both ROA and Tobin’s Q. However, statistical analysis show that the presence of a government representative as a board member has a positive impact on firm performance, as indicated by the positive coefficient for ROA and TOBINQ. An important implication of this result is that the presence of a government representative as a board member has a positive impact on firm performance, indicating that government employees board members is a valuable resource to the firm. This result is in line with the presumption of the resource dependence theory, that board members can act as a link between firms and access to valuable resource.(Hillman et al., 2009). Regulators such as Oman Capital Market Authority can use the study findings to issue recommendations to restructure boards in a way that some firms do not gain preferential treatment because of connection to government and political lobbyist.

Item Type:Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)
Uncontrolled Keywords:governance mechanism, political
Subjects:H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Divisions:International Business School
ID Code:60774
Deposited By: Fazli Masari
Deposited On:28 Feb 2017 01:42
Last Modified:03 Aug 2017 01:21

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