

TRUST BASED FLOODING ATTACK DETECTION AND
RESPONSE MECHANISMS FOR AD HOC ON-DEMAND
DISTANCE VECTOR ROUTING PROTOCOL

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This project report is dedicated to my beloved wife, father, mother and sister for their endless support and encouragement.

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ABSTRACT

Mobile Ad hoc Networks provide a structure-less environment, enabling participants in the coverage mobile nodes to communicate each other without using any centralized authentication agent. Thus, it is compromised in face to various sorts of attacks. Unfortunately, none of the presented secured routing protocols can detect internal Denial of Service (DoS) attacks by itself naturally. One of the most important and effective internal misbehaviors which has dramatic side effects on the network's throughput is Flooding Attack. This project aims at proposing an alternative solution to detect and respond Flooding Attack in MANET which is based on cooperative trust evaluation mechanisms. Actually, this approach is matched to basic principles of distributed networks in which the participating nodes are responsible for any needed creation, operation and maintenance of the network. Moreover, it seems useful for high mobility networks where the suspicious nodes move around the area repeatedly. Consequently, the gained results of the project prove that the proposed Trust-based Cooperation mechanisms decreases the side effects of Flooding Attack on Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector routing protocol.

ABSTRAK

Rangkaian Segera Bergerak (Mobile Adhoc Network) menyediakan persekitaran kurang berstruktur, membolehkan pengguna yang berada di dalam kawasan liputan untuk berkomunikasi di antara satu sama lain tanpa menggunakan sebarang agen pengesahan berpusat. Oleh itu, ia mampu berhadapan dengan pelbagai jenis serangan. Malangnya, tiada satu pun protokol laluan keselamatan tersebut dapat mengesan Denial of Service (DOS) dalaman yang diserang oleh diri sendiri secara semulajadi. Di antara kepentingan dan keberkesanan tingkahlaku dalaman yang memberi kesan sampingan kepada laluan rangkaian ialah *Serangan Banjir* (Flooding Attack). Projek ini bertujuan untuk mencari penyelesaian alternatif bagi mengesan dan bertindakbalas dengan *Serangan Banjir* dalam MANET yang mana ia berteraskan mekanisma penilaian kepercayaan kerjasama. Sebenarnya, pendekatan ini berpadanan dengan asas prinsip kepada rangkaian yang beredar / bergerak di mana node atau laluan yang turut serta adalah bertanggungjawab kepada sebarang keperluan yang dicipta, pengoperasian dan penyelenggaraan kepada rangkaian. Selain itu, ia sangat berguna untuk rangkaian bergerak yang tinggi di mana node yang mencurigakan bergerak mengelilingi kawasan tersebut secara berulang-ulang. Kesimpulannya, hasil keputusan yang diperolehi dari projek ini membuktikan bahawa cadangan mekanisma Trust-based Cooperation dapat mengurangkan kesan sampingan *Serangan Banjir* (Flooding Attack) kepada protokol laluan On-Demand Distance Vector.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	TITLE	PAGE
	DECLARATION	ii
	DEDICATION	iii
	ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iv
	ABSTRACT	v
	ABSTRAK	vi
	TABLE OF CONTENTS	vii
	LIST OF TABLES	xiii
	LIST OF FIGURES	xv
	LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xvii
1	INTRODUCTION	
	1.1 Overview	1
	1.2 Problem background	2
	1.3 Problem statement	4
	1.4 Aim of the project	5
	1.5 Objectives of the project	5
	1.6 Scope of the project	6
	1.7 Significance of the study	6
2	LITERATURE REVIEW	
	2.1 Introduction	7
	2.2 MANET and its routing attacks	8
	2.2.1 Overview of Mobile Ad hoc Network	8

2.2.2	Routing Attacks in MANET	9
2.3	Analysis of Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector routing protocol (AODV)	10
2.3.1	The algorithm of AODV	11
2.3.2	AODV path discovery	11
2.3.3	AODV reverse path	13
2.4	Overview of categorized approaches to mitigate Flooding attack	13
2.5	Related approaches to detect and mitigate Flooding attack in MANET	15
2.5.1	First effort to prevent flooding attack in MANET (FAP)	15
2.5.2	AMTT scheme, an effort to eliminate FAP holes	17
2.5.3	Effective Filtering schemes against RREQ Flooding Attack	19
2.5.4	Secure scheme against Data Flooding Attack	21
2.6	Trust based approaches related to detect Flooding attack in MAENT	23
2.6.1	Direct trust estimation techniques	23
2.6.2	Cooperative trust based techniques	26
2.7	Discussion	28
3	METHODOLOGY	
3.1	Introduction	33
3.2	Research Procedure	34
3.2.1	Phase 1: Investigating and analyzing MANET and Flooding Attack	36
3.2.2	Phase 2: Designing proposed trust-based Flooding Attack detection and response mechanisms on Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector routing protocol	37
3.2.3	Phase3: Evaluation and reporting of the project	38

3.3	Research Instruments Used	38
3.4	Data analysis	38
3.5	Evaluation	40
3.6	Summary	42
4	DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION	
4.1	Introduction	43
4.2	AODV routing protocol implementation on Network Simulator (NS2)	44
4.2.1	Required AODV functions for implementing the project	45
4.2.2	Format of AODV Trace File	48
4.3	Analysis of proposed Trust based mechanism relied on AODV	49
4.3.1	Infrastructures of the proposed trust based mechanism	50
4.3.1.1	Trust values normalization	50
4.3.1.2	Trust level and threshold definition	51
4.3.1.3	Array of trust table structure	51
4.3.1.4	Trust packet type and Trust header definition	52
4.3.2	Real-time trust based attack detection and response	53
4.3.2.1	Detecting repeated route request packet	54
4.3.2.2	Trust level computation and assigning corresponding threshold	56
4.3.2.3	Flooding attack detection and response	57
4.3.2.4	Sending Trust Packet	60
4.3.3	Trust level increment for the legal source nodes	61
4.3.3.1	Trust table update and print	61

4.3.3.2	Interval checking for periodic reporting trust values	62
4.3.4	Collective trust based cooperation module	63
4.3.4.1	Virtual society creation by using trust based cooperation module	65
4.4	Flooding attack	66
4.5	TCL implementation	67
4.5.1	Mobile nodes configuration of the simulation	68
4.5.2	Topography setting and mobile node creation	69
4.6	Summary	70
5	RESULTS AND DISCUSISONS	
5.1	Introduction	71
5.2	Reasons of using proposed method	71
5.2.1	Comparison functionality of AODV before and after occurring attack	72
5.3	Comparing default and modified AODV in different scenarios	73
5.3.1	Comparison results of default and modified AODV in Small Network	74
5.3.1.1	Averaged Dropped Packets of Small Network comparison	74
5.3.1.2	Averaged Packet Delivery Ratio of Small Network Scenario comparison	75
5.3.1.3	Averaged Throughput of Small Network Scenario comparison	76
5.3.1.4	Analysis of Small Network Scenario results	77
5.3.2	Comparison Results of Default and Modified AODV in Medium Network	78
5.3.2.1	Averaged Dropped Packets of Medium Network comparison	79

5.3.2.2	Averaged Packet Delivery Ratio of Medium Network Scenario comparison	80
5.3.2.3	Averaged Throughput of Medium Network Scenario comparison	81
5.3.2.4	Analysis of Medium Network Scenario results	82
5.3.3	Comparison results of Default and Modified AODV in Wide Network	84
5.3.3.1	Averaged Dropped Packets of Wide Network comparison	85
5.3.3.2	Averaged Packet Delivery Ratio of Wide Network Scenario comparison	86
5.3.3.3	Averaged Throughput of Wide Network Scenario comparison	87
5.3.3.4	Analysis of Wide Network Scenario results	88
5.4	Results Discussion	89
5.4.1	Packet Delivery Ratio Discussion	89
5.4.2	Dropped Packets Discussion	90
5.4.3	Averaged Throughput Discussion	91
5.4.4	Results Discussion Settlement	93
5.5	Summary	94
6	CONCLUSION	
6.1	Project Achievements	96
6.1.1	Overview of the Study	96
6.1.2	Review of the Results	97
6.1.2.1	Implication of the Results	98
6.1.3	Limitation of the Study	98
6.2	Recommendations	99
6.2.1	Recommendation based on the results	99

6.2.2 Recommendations for Future Research Works	99
REFERENCES	101

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE NO.	TITLE	PAGE
2.1	Format of AMTT	18
2.2	Individual trust Metrics to collect overall trust estimation	25
2.3	Assigned trust level to normalized trust estimated	26
2.4	Classification of current related approaches	29
2.5	Trust based approaches to resist Flooding Attack in MANET	30
3.1	Simulation assumptions and settings table	41
3.2	Simulated scenarios definitions table	42
4.1	AODV Trace File Explanation Table	49
4.2	Trust level assigning table	51
5.1	Comparison table of default AODV functionality before and after occurring Flooding Attack with modified AODV by trust based mechanism	72
5.2	Small Network Scenario results comparison table	74
5.3	Node Density and Neighbor Count Calculation table for Small Network Scenario	78
5.4	Medium Network Scenario results comparison table	79
5.5	Node Density and Neighbor Count Calculation table	83

	for Medium Network Scenario	
5.6	Wide Network Scenario results comparison table	84
5.7	Node Density and Neighbor Count Calculation table for Wide Network Scenario	89

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE NO.	TITLE	PAGE
2.1	RREQ packet fields	11
2.2	Forward and Reverse Path, respectively in AODV diagram	12
2.3	Filtering scheme flowchart	21
2.4	Integration of SMRTI and Fellowship architectures	28
3.1	Schematic of the Research Framework	35
3.2	Security issues in MANET stack	36
3.3	Operational Framework for relations between main modules	37
3.4	Simulator usage graph for MANET	39
4.1	Class inheritance of AODV in NS2 diagram	44
4.2	Files reference of AODV in NS2 diagram	45
4.3	Trace format of AODV	48
4.4	Trust Packet type and header definition	52
4.5	<i>recvAODV()</i> Function with AODV Trust Type source code	53
4.6	<i>RecvAODV ()</i> Function with AODV Trust Type diagram	54

4.7	RREQ Recorder Row diagram	55
4.8	Counting Broadcasted RREQ packets by Real time Trust based module pseudo code	55
4.9	Computing Trust-Level and assigning Threshold pseudo code	57
4.10	Malicious node detection and resistance pseudo code	58
4.11	Giving another chance to the restricted sender pseudo code	59
4.12	Real Time module of Trust based Flooding Attack Detection and Resistance Flowchart	59
4.13	Broadcasting a Trust Packet to report occurred attack pseudo code	60
4.14	Pseudo code of <i>trustTableUpdate()</i> procedure	62
4.15	Pseudo code of <i>trustTablePrint()</i> procedure	62
4.16	Pseudo code of <i>recvTrust()</i> void function	64
4.17	Nodes adjacence as a virtual society diagram	66
4.18	Flooding attack procedure implementation pseudo code	67
4.19	Mobile nodes simulation configuration	69
4.20	Topography setting and node creation	70

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMTT	Avoiding Mistaken Transmission Table
AODV	Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector
ARAN	Authenticated Routing for Ad-hoc Networks
DOS	Denial of Service
DSDV	Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector Routing
DSR	Dynamic Source Routing
FAP	Flooding Attack Prevention
FIFO	First in First Out
MANET	Mobile Ad hoc Network
MS	Microsoft
NS2	Network Simulation ver.2
PRP	Proactive Routing Protocols
RAD	Random Assessment Delay
RREP	Route Reply
RREQ	Route Request
RRER	Route Error
RRP	Reactive Routing Protocols
SAODV	Secure Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector
SEAD	Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance Vector Routing Protocol
SMRTI	MANET Routing with Trust Intrigue
WEP	Wired Equivalent Privacy
WSN	Wireless Sensor Network

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview

Today, Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANET) have been popular because of its exclusive characteristics which have allowed wireless devices to connect each other easily when fall in the radio coverage of each other [1]. Also, each node performs the roles of an end-system and works also as a router to forward packet through the network; therefore, mobile ad hoc network uses the concept of multi hop communication. In addition, every node can move in the network freely. This mobility is as a result of dynamic topology in MANET without any infrastructure requirements such as centralized access point or centralized administration. As a result, each node is in charge of its security threats [2]. Actually, the lack of infrastructure in MANET nominates this kind of networks for using wherever the implementation of network infrastructure is impossible or too expensive such as military usages, emergency applications, PDA networking, and usual applications such as wireless meeting or classroom.

MANET uses routing protocols to route packets to destination like the conventional wired networks which are divided into PRP (Proactive Routing Protocol) and RRP (Reactive Routing Protocol) [3, 4]. Proactive Routing Protocols is called Table Driven Routing Protocol too. In PRP the routing information of all nodes are stored by the others, and routing updates are propagated whenever the topology of the network changes [5]. Another side, in the case of RRP, route

between the nodes is searched only whenever a source node wants to communicate with the others; they use Flooding method to discover the route by sending route request message which will be replied by the purposed destination. But the method of on-demand routing to facilitate route discovery may be used by the Intruders or the malicious node to consume the network resources, leading to Flooding attack [6, 7].

The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows; the second section will be discussed problem background, subsequently, problem statement will be described; the rest of the chapter is allocated for the objectivity of the project and its scope; finally, significant of the project and references are cited.

1.2 Problem background

According to properties of MANET, especially the lack of network infrastructure such as centralized administration, every node consists of many sorts of attacks; mostly, denial of service attacks. Although, using RRP (On demand Routing Protocols) have irrefutable benefits for mobile ad hoc network, however, they increase the risk of DoS attacks.

Actually, like conventional wired networks, MANET uses routing protocols to forward packets to the destination; Proactive routing protocols also, known as table-driven protocols is based on routing table between nodes. However, the main advantage of Proactive routing protocols can be declared as predictability of the control over head on these protocols; since it has a fixed upper bound which enables it to be independent to the traffic profiles [22]. In contrary, as disadvantages, we can state that they are not scalable perfectly and maintenance of routing table requires substantial network resources [20]. On the other hand, Reactive routing protocols or on-demand routing protocols are developed for MANET to direct packets to the destination. In fact they indicate the real basis of MANET which provides more

dynamic networks in comparison with structured ones. In the on demand routing protocols, nodes search for a route when they want to communicate with each other. To discover the routes they use route discovery procedure which in turns uses the Flooding method. Therefore, updating of the routing information is presented whenever a node requires a route instead of periodically updating the route information. Consequently, the control overhead will be reduced, especially in high mobility networks where the periodical update causes significant waste overhead [22]. However, on demand, routing protocols are categorized into secured on demand routing protocols such as SAODV [29], SEAD [32], SRP [21], ARAN [2], and Adriane [30]. And non-secure on demand routing protocols such as AODV [11] and DSR [23]. According to the studies, AODV is one of the most popular routing protocols for implementing additional DoS Attack detection modules because of its dynamic structure and perfect performance [12, 13].

In fact, MANET Flooding Attack is known as a harmful DoS attack which affects on functionality of almost all RRP's sharply. Mobile Ad hoc Flooding attack makes it possible for an adversary to carry out DoS by saturating the support with a quantity of broadcasting messages, by reducing the output of nodes, and in the worst case, to prevent them from communicating. In fact, there is similar attack in conventional wired networks which is popularly called SYN Flooding attack. In this attack, the attacker sends many TCP connection requests with spoofed source addresses to a victim. As a result, the resources of the victim host will be exhausted; subsequently, no more incoming TCP connection can be established by this machine [8].

Before describing Flooding Attack in MANET, it seems necessary to describe more about on-demand protocols especially AODV [11] which this project is relied on. AODV is one of the on-demand routing protocols, designed for MANET to manage unicast, multicast, and broadcast announcement. Actually, AODV is developed by using some principles of DSR [23] and DSDV [24] which are route discovery and route preservation from DSR and hop by hop steering sequence number and sporadic beacons from DSDV, respectively.

Actually, Flooding attack in MANET is categorized to two types which are Route Request (RREQ) Flooding attack and Data Flooding attack [8]. In RREQ Flooding attack the attacker broadcasts many route requests without consider to Rate-Limit, roundtrip-time, and Back-off-time. On the other hand, Data Flooding Attack occurs when an attacker creates a communication path with a victim node; and in the next step sends a huge amount of useless data packets to it to exhaust recourses of all intermediate nodes and waste bandwidth of the network. Because of the authentication methods implemented in on-demand protocols, the intermediate nodes cannot understand the contents of the packets, but they can just forward them to the destination; therefore, no one can detect data Flooding attack except the application layer of destination node [8].

Many valued efforts for sure have been tried to mitigate Flooding attack in MANET by using vary approaches such as FAP [8], AMTT [14], Filtering scheme [9, 10], and Trust scheme; but consequently, it seems that none of the mentioned mechanisms could solve Flooding attack in MANET totally. In fact, each of them has its specific limitations to solve both types Flooding Attack which will be described comprehensively in the rest of this article. However, this project proposes an alternative trust based scheme which is combination of related solution's strength and it is relied on cooperation between friend nodes. The main idea of this approach is coming from a friendship based framework [44, 45]; in the proposed scheme, we try to collect trust values from two ways as direct trust estimation and indirect trust value (Recommended trust) which are coming from friend neighboring nodes with a coefficient value that indicates their efficiency level in the decisions.

1.3 Problem statement

Although, Flooding Attack does not use any complex process to flood network, but the secured routing protocols cannot detect this attack naturally. This research tries to use a trust based mechanism to response route request Flooding Attack in MANET according to neighbor suppression approach. Moreover,

cooperative mechanism to collect information about suspicious nodes can restrict them for long term in the virtual societies greatly; then the problem of stranger nodes in high mobility situations can be solved too. Furthermore, this cooperation is based on both direct and indirect trust evaluation approach which is introduced as a suitable approach for distributed networks such as MANET or WSN [38]. This research will try to show that cooperation of friend nodes can develop a trusted set of nodes which can help to each other to make the best decision about a suspicious node and limiting its capabilities to Flooding area by using both direct trust calculating and recommended (indirect) trust computing simultaneously.

1.4 Aim of the project

This project tries to detect MANET Flooding attack by proposing a trust based mechanism as an alternative solution and also response side effects of this internal misbehavior.

1.5 Objectives of the project

In order to mentioned aims of the project, the objectives of the project related to flooding problem in MANET are stated as below:

- To analyze existing problems and solutions in MANET, related to Flooding attacks.
- To design alternative solution for MANET Flooding attack problem by using trust based mechanisms.
- To evaluate trust based Flooding Attack detection and response mechanisms for Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector routing protocol.

1.6 Scope of project

The scope of this project is defined as following:

- Evaluations will be conducted only in simulation.
- Trust based Flooding Attack detection and response mechanisms will be compared with the original AODV routing protocol.

1.7 Significance of the study

The outcome of the project is to detect route request Flooding attack by using an enterprise trust based mechanism which controls active nodes of MANET to detect and response Flooding Attack. Actually, this method works as a friendship system to identify suspicious senders for long term and decrease the side effects of their attacks by monitoring their propagation. This project aims at introducing an alternative trust based mechanism to record background activities of vicious nodes and setup a plural opinion system for recognizing strangers in high mobility situation.

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