

A PROTOTYPE FOR FILESYSTEM INTEGRITY CHECKER IN USER-SPACE
MOOD

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Dedicated to

My beloved parents, my darling siblings and to all whom were beside me

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Having the chance to be in this honourable institute is an unforgettable moments in my life. The Centre for Advanced Software Engineering at UTM was an everyday opportunity to acquire the knowledge that I look for. Many thanks to each lecturer in there; they were my guidance to achieve my goals.

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ABSTRACT

Today, improving the security of computer systems has become a vital and challenging problem. Attackers can seriously damage the integrity of filesystems. Attack detection is complex and time-consuming for system administrators, and it is becoming more so. One of the means to detect intruder's activity is to trace all unauthorized changes in a filesystem. Current user-space mood checkers, due to being slow detectors, suffer from the opportunity gap that occurs between filesystem checks. Basing on the principle of thinking like an attacker, this prototype is developed to minimize the total time taken for checking by focusing on critical files. The proposed technique will accelerate the checking process through acquiring specific file extensions from the filesystem rather than targeting the entire filesystem. Discrepancies in the filesystem are reported after comparing current files hashing values with original hashing values. This prototype is configured to use variety of hashing algorithms to measure the performance on different scales and to provide various choices for users. Research results on Windows Server 2003 show that the average total time taken for this prototype is in the range of three to four minutes. The elapsed time of filesystem checking by Windows System File Check tool "SFC" has been decreased to eighty five percent on this prototype.

ABSTRAK

Hari ini, usaha untuk menambahbaik sistem keselamatan komputer telah menjadi semakin rumit dan mencabar. Penyerang boleh memusnahkan sesebuah integriti sistem fail secara kritikal. Pengesanan serangan sangat kompleks dan menjimatkan masa untuk pengurus sistem dan menjadi semakin baik. Salah satu cara untuk mengesan aktiviti penceroboh ialah dengan mengesan semua perubahan yang tidak dikenali di dalam sistem fail. Pemeriksa mud ruang-pengguna sekarang dengan yang menjadi pengesan yang perlahan, dibebani oleh peluang ruang yang berada diantara pemeriksaan sistem fail. Mengambil kira prinsip pemikiran penyerang, prototaip ini dibangunkan untuk meminimumkan jumlah masa yang diambil untuk pemeriksaan dengan menumpukan kepada fail yang kritikal. Tujuan teknik ini adalah dengan mempercepatkan proses pemeriksaan dengan mengumpul fail tambahan yang tertentu di dalam sistem fail tersebut daripada mengasaskan kesemua sistem fail. Perbezaan di dalam sistem fail boleh dilaporkan dengan membandingkan nilai fail semasa cincang dengan nilai cincang yang asal. Prototaip ini ditetapkan untuk menggunakan pelbagai algoritma cincang untuk mengukur keupayaan dari skala yang berbeza dan menyediakan pelbagai pilihan kepada pengguna. Keputusan kajian dari *Windows Server 2003* menunjukkan bahawa purata masa yang diperlukan oleh prototaip ini adalah tiga hingga empat minit. Masa yang digunakan oleh sistem fail ini yang diperiksa oleh peranti *Windows System File Check "SFC"* telah dikurangkan kepada lapan puluh lima peratus jika menggunakan prototaip ini.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The health of a server needs to be assessed and protected in much the same manner as the health of a person. The server's main task is to provide services to other computer programs and their users, either in the same or other computers. Monitoring is the use of automated processes to continually collect and analyze the operation of critical server services. Monitoring is an important part of delivering a high-quality messaging service and for achieving commitments of service level agreements. The overall goal of monitoring is to avoid possible service outages by predicting problems and by quickly noticing problems that cannot be predicted. This can be accomplished by either continually polling the monitored component or by receiving or detecting events from these components.

1.2 Problem Background

Effective front-line monitoring of a server means watching the details for a large number of events and performance counters on potentially hundreds of servers. Effective monitoring requires more than simply knowing whether services are running and the databases are mounted. It is highly needed to know the details if it is required to monitor a server in a proactive rather than a reactive manner. Without

detailed and diligent monitoring, our first indication of a problem will likely be a telephone call from an unhappy user or customer. At that point, system administrators probably have a service interruption, and service interruptions are bad news for an enterprise as an example.

The amount of hacking activity on the Internet has been revealed after one company set up an anonymous “dummy test” server and found it was maliciously attacked 467 times within 24 hours of being installed. That news has been published on ZDNet website by Graham Hayday [17], the server which contained no data and had no public profile, was attacked every single day over the next three weeks. All these statistics show that servers are still targeted by attacks day after day.

Another evidence of the activities against servers that are derived from the statistics that Cyber Security Malaysia website provides [23] proves that many breaches have been growing on the recent years. System intrusions represent big numbers year after year and that explain how much servers are suffering.

All those numbers and figures point that servers are still in need to be audited and scanned regularly. It has been mentioned by Don Mosley [28] when he claimed that the area of real-time Intrusion Detection and Prevention utilizing intelligent routers or various network attached appliances has received much press in the last few years. He continued “should any of these defenses provide less than 100% effective coverage the user will be left unaware of any 'mischief' that might have gotten through. There is still a need for non real-time scanning of system files to determine any unauthorized modifications. This type of audit is often the only effective way to spot malicious activity originating from inside the enterprise network.”

After all, there is still a lack of that kind of scanning over filesystem to find out any illegal alterations. This kind of audit is mostly the successful way to catch unpleasant activities originating from inside and outside. Whilst, windows servers are not really supported with many security features as many as what is there in

Linux servers. One of the most important is the server monitoring. In order to achieve better security, servers require monitoring in many aspects, one of which is foremost is the filesystem.

1.3 Problem Statement

Online security concerns grow day after day as new viruses and worms are released. Because of this, it is now more important than ever to monitor the server's filesystem for signs of compromise. In order to accomplish that, this project will answer the following questions; How to monitor the filesystem of Windows server operating system? What are the critical files that it should monitor? In what way and when does the server launch the alerts?

1.4 Project Objectives

The objectives of this project are intended to:

1. Investigate a method of server monitoring on Windows server provided by Microsoft.
2. Design and develop a prototype of server monitoring that enhances the investigated method from time perspective.
3. Test the prototype and compare the results to any available Windows server monitoring system.

1.5 Project Aim

The aim of the project is to develop the monitoring of filesystem integrity in Windows server. As well as, is to minimize the total time that the filesystem integrity checker takes in the checking process in order to avoid opportunity gap weakness.

1.6 Project Scope

The scope of this project is:

1. The study concentrates on Windows server 2003 only.
2. The process of the monitoring only focuses on configuration files in the filesystem.
3. The proposed enhancement will concentrate only on accelerating the checking process of the filesystem integrity checker.

1.7 Thesis Organization

The report is divided into 5 chapters.

1. Chapter 1 describes the introduction and background of the study, the project objectives, scope, and the layout of the report.
2. Chapter 2 gives literature review on information that relate to this research.
3. Chapter 3 demonstrates the project methodology.
4. Chapter 4 represents the design and implementation of this prototype.
5. Chapter 5 shows the results of this research and finding.
6. Chapter 6 is the conclusion and summary.

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