

ENHANCED FUZZY VAULT SCHEME ON PALM VEIN BIOMETRIC  
TEMPLATE PROTECTION USING FAST WALSH HADAMARD  
TRANSFORMATION

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## **DEDICATION**

This thesis is specially dedicated to my lovely family for their endless love, support, and encouragement.

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## ABSTRACT

The widespread use of biometrics as a means of identification continues to rise a security issue for the user. Once a biometric template is compromised, it is considered broken as biometrics cannot be revoked and thus making it obsolete. This is solved by adapting to the biometric template protection scheme. However, not all approaches can meet all the requirements of the biometric template protection scheme. The first requirement is diversity where a biometric template should not link to any other template that is produced from the same original template. Next is revocability where a compromised template should be able to be replaced by a new template generated from the same original biometric template. The third requirement is irreversibility where the transformed template should not revert to the original template and lastly, the fourth requirement is a performance where the performance of the authentication system should not be affected by any methods to secure the biometric template. A fuzzy vault scheme has been widely used in the biometric template protection approach. However, the fuzzy vault scheme only provides irreversibility and performance. Thus, fast Walsh Hadamard Transformation (FWHT) hybridized with fuzzy vault namely FWHT-FV is proposed to equip fuzzy vault scheme with diversity and revocability. The palm vein dataset from Tonji University is used in this study. Then, pre-processing and feature extraction is applied using the Local Binary Pattern (LBP). The result showed that the proposed FWHT-FV achieved 1.25% FAR, 1.75% FRR, and 5.75% EER. The proposed FWHT-FV has improved the accuracy, sensitivity, and specificity by 12.87%, 16%, and 11.75% respectively. Lastly, security analysis showed that the proposed FWHT-FV is able to equip the fuzzy vault scheme with the diversity and revocability properties of the biometric template protection requirements. Hence, the proposed hybrid approach enables the fuzzy vault scheme to meet all the biometric template protection requirements which are diversity, revocability, irreversibility, and performance as well as benefiting the society and industries in the biometric template authentication field.

## ABSTRAK

Penggunaan biometrik secara meluas sebagai cara pengenalan terus menimbulkan isu keselamatan bagi pengguna. Sekiranya templat biometrik berjaya diperolehi oleh orang yang tidak bertanggungjawab, templat tersebut tidak boleh digunakan lagi. Oleh itu, perkara ini dapat diatasi dengan menepati ciri-ciri yang telah ditetapkan dalam skim perlindungan templat biometrik. Walau bagaimanapun, tidak semua teknik dapat memenuhi kesemua ciri-ciri yang telah ditetapkan oleh skim perlindungan templat biometrik. Ciri yang pertama adalah kepelbagaian dimana templat yang dihasilkan tidak seharusnya berhubung dengan templat lain yang dihasilkan dari templat asal yang sama. Ciri yang seterusnya adalah kebolehbatalan dimana sekiranya berlaku pencerobohan terhadap templat biometrik, ia seharusnya dapat dihapuskan dan diganti dengan templat yang baru dari templat asal yang sama. Seterusnya, templat biometrik perlu memiliki ciri ketakterbalikan dimana templat yang telah ditransformasi tidak boleh kembali ke templat yang asal dan akhir sekali adalah prestasi dimana prestasi sistem pengecaman tidak seharusnya terjejas oleh teknik yang digunakan untuk melindungi templat biometrik tersebut. Skim peti besi kabur telah digunakan secara meluas dalam pendekatan perlindungan templat biometrik. Walau bagaimanapun, skim peti besi kabur hanya menepati ciri ketakterbalikan dan prestasi. Oleh itu, transformasi *Walsh Hadamard* pantas (*FWHT*) telah digabungkan bersama skim peti besi kabur iaitu *FWHT-FV* untuk melengkapi skim peti besi kabur dengan kepelbagaian dan kebolehbatalan. Set data urat tapak tangan dari Universiti Tonji telah digunakan dalam kajian ini. Kemudian, pra-pemprosesan dan pengekstrakan telah dijalankan menggunakan corak binari tempatan (*LBP*). Keputusan menunjukkan bahawa pendekatan *FWHT-FV* mencapai 1.25% *FAR*, 1.75% *FRR* dan 5.75% *EER*. Pendekatan *FWHT-FV* telah meningkatkan ketepatan, sensitiviti dan kekhususan masing-masing sebanyak 12.87%, 16% dan 11.75%. Akhir sekali, analisis keselamatan menunjukkan bahawa pendekatan *FWHT-FV* mampu melengkapi skim peti besi kabur dengan ciri-ciri kepelbagaian dan kebolehbatalan. Dengan itu, teknik penggabungan ini telah melengkapi skim peti besi kabur dengan kesemua ciri-ciri yang telah ditetapkan oleh skim perlindungan templat biometrik, iaitu kepelbagaian, kebolehbatalan, ketakterbalikan dan prestasi. Disamping itu, teknik ini juga dapat memberi manfaat kepada masyarakat dan industri dalam bidang perlindungan biometrik.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

FAR	- False Acceptance Rate
FRR	- False Rejection Rate
FV	- Fuzzy Vault
FWHT	- Fast Walsh Hadamard Transformation
FWHT-FV	- Fast Walsh Hadamard Transformation with Fuzzy Vault
ROP	- Random Orthogonal Projection

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Overview

Today, biometrics has become part of our everyday life. From the start of the day to the end of the night, biometrics has made our life easy. The closest example of biometric is in our smartphone where it is used as an authentication token. Biometrics can be classified as physical and behavioral based where face, fingerprints, palm print, palm vein, hand geometry, iris, and finger vein are examples of physical biometric based and signature, gaits, keystrokes, and voice are examples of behavioral-based biometric.



Figure 1.1 Examples of biometric traits.

Biometric is widely used in authentication and identification as it possesses beneficial properties which are reliability, convenience, and universality (Andalib & Abdulla-Al-Shami, 2013). The properties are unique and measurable which makes it the perfect model to represent an individual. Furthermore, the use of biometrics is

much more convenient as the user no longer needs to remember a password or carry any token as the biometric lies within themselves. According to Chin et al., (2014), there are four main components in a biometric authentication system where number one is the sensor module in which to obtain the raw biometric data. Next, preprocessing and feature extraction module where enhancement and extraction of important feature take place. After that, the matching module where the query feature is compared with the stored template and lastly is the decision module where the system decides to authenticate or reject a user.




Figure 1.2 Different modules in biometric authentication system (Sarkar & Singh, 2020).

However, as the use of biometrics is rising, the security of raw biometrics is decreasing as there are many impostors out there who are trying to break the security of the biometric authentication system. Once a biometric template is compromised, it is considered broken as biometric cannot be revoked or canceled. Therefore, a biometric template protection authentication scheme is needed to protect the biometric template.




Figure 1.3 Classification of biometric template protection scheme.

Biometric template protection scheme can be categorized into two categories which are cancellable biometric and biometric cryptosystem. An example of cancellable biometrics is non-invertible transforms and salting. These methods provide security to templates by generating a transformed template that can be overridden whenever is needed (Chin et al., 2014). However, the security of this method depends on the secrecy of the key which makes it less suitable for authentication. Meanwhile, an example of a biometric cryptosystem is key binding and key generation. This method is categorized based on how the helper data is generated. In key binding schemes, helper data is derived by binding a chosen key to a biometric template while in the key generation scheme, helper data is derived directly from the biometric template. As fuzzy commitment only accepts binary features (Favre et al., 2015), the fuzzy vault is more popular in the key binding scheme as it can deal with an unordered set of data as biometric data possesses inherent fuzziness (Sarkar & Singh, 2020).

According to ISO/IEC standard 24745, a biometric template protection scheme has to fulfil certain requirements. The first requirement is diversity and is also known as unlinkability refers to the capacity to produce multiple unique templates from a single biometric feature such that none of them can be linked to either the original template or to each other in any way in order to prevent cross-matching and to ensure



user's privacy (Lahmidi et al., 2022; Sarkar & Singh, 2020). For example, the biometric template that undergoes transformation  $x$  should not link to a template from transformation  $y$  that came from the same original template.

The second requirement is revocability, which means that the mechanism employed to safeguard the template must be capable of obtaining a compromised template using the same biometric data. In other words, this attribute is demonstrated by replacing a biometric template that has been compromised with a new template created from the same biometric trait that is remarkably different from the compromised template (Lahmidi et al., 2022). For example, if biometric template is under attack from outsider, the system should be able to cancel the compromised template and replaced it with a new template generated from the same original template by changing the transformation parameter without affecting the user authentication process.

Meanwhile, the third requirement is irreversibility where the transformed template should not be able to revert to its original template in order to ensure the security of the biometric data and to guarantee the user privacy (Lahmidi et al., 2022; Sarkar & Singh, 2020). For example, if the attacker gained information on the transformed template, the information should not lead to the original template and forbid the recreation of the original template.

The last requirement is performance where the method used to secure the biometric template should not affect the performance of the authentication system. For example, the accuracy of the improved authentication system should not be lower from the previous authentication system. Simply put, a biometric template protection system provides methods and answers for a variety of biometric templates without compromising the system's performance (Sandhya & Prasad, 2017).

However, it is difficult for a biometric template protection scheme to fulfill all the requirements stated (Sarkar & Singh, 2020). For example, the fuzzy vault key binding scheme is unable to fulfill the revocability requirements of the biometric template protection scheme (Ponce-Hernandez et al., 2019). This attack happens when

the attacker is aware of other vaults that use the same biometric traits to safeguard them. The correlation between the vaults could be used by the attacker to find the genuine point set and discover the original template. A compromised template cannot be cancelled or issued again since biometric traits are limited and unchangeable (Bansal et al., 2015). As a result, the original template may be permanently deleted and unable to be used for any further authentication.

Many improvement methods have been suggested to improve the revocability requirements in the fuzzy vault scheme. Among them, a hybrid of cancellable and cryptosystem methods has been employed and reported to performed robustly in many studies (Bansal et al., 2015; Kaur & Sofat, 2017; Leng & Teoh, 2015; Li & Hu, 2016; Mahendran & Velusamy, 2020; Ponce-Hernandez et al., 2019, 2020; Singla et al., 2017; Sree, 2016; J. Zhang & Fang, 2018). This is due to the fact that a new template can be used to replace the compromised one by altering the index vector based on the same biometric in a non-invertible transform, providing diversity and revocability (Bansal et al., 2015).

Previous study shows that the selection of cancellable biometric methods is important. This is because, the process of combining cancellable biometric and biometric cryptosystem will increase the processing time of the overall authentication process (Jegade, 2017). Therefore, it is important to choose methods that can limit the processing time. Singla et al., (2017) for example used fast walsh hadamard transformation with fuzzy vault as fast Walsh Hadamard transformation is easy to compute. However, their fuzzy vault construct used Cyclic redundancy check (CRC) instead of error correcting codes. The used of CRC adds to the time complexity as each authentication attempt requires evaluating a large number of point combinations (Ponce-Hernandez et al., 2019).

Thus, this research proposed hybridization of fuzzy vault with fast Walsh Hadamard transformation function to enhance the fuzzy vault template protection scheme with the used of palm vein biometric.

## **1.2 Problem Statement**

The increasing usage of biometrics as an authentication mechanism is indeed a stepping stone towards a modern era in this world. However, keeping the biometric template safe is a continuous challenge. The success of keeping the security of biometric authentication is to be able to satisfy all the biometric template protection scheme requirements which are diversity, revocability, security, and performance as mentioned in the problem background. The challenge is that not all the template protection scheme is able to satisfy all the requirement stated (Sarkar & Singh, 2020). Fuzzy vault template protection scheme is able to provide irreversibility and performance to biometric templates. However, it does not offer revocability and diversity. Therefore, this study aims to enhance the fuzzy vault template protection scheme that is able to meet all the biometric template protection requirements as well as improve the security of the authentication scheme.

## **1.3 Research Question**

The research question for this study is as below:

- (a) What are the limitations of the existing fuzzy vault scheme?
- (b) What is the best method to overcome the limitation of fuzzy vault scheme?
- (c) How does an improved fuzzy vault scheme can satisfy the biometric template protection requirements in terms of revocability and diversity?

## **1.4 Objectives**

In order to achieve the goals of this study which is to enhance the fuzzy vault template protection scheme, the objectives are as below:

- (d) To study the limitation of the existing Fuzzy Vault Scheme to protect biometric templates.
- (e) To propose an improved Fuzzy Vault Scheme that can provide revocability and diversity.
- (f) To evaluate and validate the performance of the improved fuzzy vault scheme in terms of revocability and diversity.

## **1.5 Scope of Research**

The scopes of the research are as follows:

- (a) Tongji palm vein datasets were used (Zhang et al., 2018). The dataset consists of 600 palms from 300 volunteers from Tongji University, Shanghai, China. The total images used for authentication are 6000 palm vein images.
- (b) The resolution of all the images used are of 128x128 ppi.
- (c) Feature extraction method used for all the images is Local Binary Pattern (LBP).
- (d) Fast Walsh Hadamard transformation and random orthonormal transformation is used to transform 6000 palm vein images respectively.
- (e) Fuzzy vault scheme is used as the authentication mechanism.
- (f) False acceptance rate and false rejection rate is used to evaluate the performance of the authentication scheme.

## **1.6 Significant of Research**

This research introduced the hybrid of fuzzy vault scheme and fast Walsh Hadamard Transformation (FWHT) function to enhance the fuzzy vault scheme. The proposed method increases the performance of the fuzzy vault scheme and is able to meet the revocability and diversity requirements of the biometric template protection scheme.

The hybrid of non-invertible transformation and fuzzy vault enable fuzzy vault to utilize the advantages of non-invertible transformation which is revocability and diversity. Therefore, fuzzy vault scheme can be equipped with revocability and diversity properties in biometric template protection scheme.

In addition, this research is important to benefit the society and industries as biometric has become one of the most popular authentication mechanism. Therefore, it is important to make sure that the template security is at the highest level in order to overcome attacks from unauthorized parties.

## **1.7 Thesis Organization**

This thesis has been organized into several chapters as follows:

- (a) Chapter 1 discusses the problem background, problem statement, objectives, scopes, and significance of the study.
- (b) Chapter 2 reviews the details of the biometric template protection scheme which includes an explanation of biometric authentication, feature transformation approach, and issues related to biometric template protection.
- (c) Chapter 3 describes the methodology used in each phase of the research. The research framework, the data and software used as well as the method for performance measures used in this research.

- (d) Chapter 4 presents the proposed scheme and discusses the result and validation of the research. The results are compared between the types of feature transformation method and the proposed method.
- (e) Chapter 5 summarizes and concludes the study which includes several findings and contributions of the research. The suggestion for future work is also provided in this chapter.

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